Manipulationsmythos

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Synonyme

Manipulationsmythos, myth of the digital propaganda wizard

Definitionen

Wie schon bei Cambridge Analytica, mit dem Team Jorge offenbar auch Berührungspunkte hatte, verfallen die Medien wieder dem üblichen „Manipulationsmythos“. Auch wenn Hunderte von orchestrierten Fake Accounts wohl authentischer wirken als eine auf mich zugeschnittene Facebook-Werbung, die mich politisch „umdrehen“ will: die Wirksamkeit der Methoden solcher kommerziellen Desinformationsfirmen sind bisher politikwissenschaftlich nicht genügend untersucht und damit belegt worden. Es lässt sich relativ wenig über deren Effektivität sagen, auch wenn ihnen kritisch zu begegnen ist.

Von Adrienne Fichter im Text Zu skandalös oder zu unkritisch (2023)

Much of the attention paid by researchers, journalists, and elected officials to online disinformation and propaganda has assumed that these disinformation campaigns are both large in scale and directly effective. This is a bad assumption, and it is an unnecessary assumption. We need not believe digital propaganda can “hack” the minds of a fickle electorate to conclude that digital propaganda is a substantial threat to the stability of American democracy. And in promoting the narrative of IRA’s direct effectiveness, we run the risk of further exacerbating this threat. The danger of online disinformation isn’t how it changes public knowledge; it’s what it does to our democratic norms.

Von David Karpf im Text On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths (2019)

Bemerkungen

Wie sich die Kampagnen von Team Jorge in Nigeria, Indonesien, Griechenland etc. auswirkten, wissen wir nicht. Renommierte Politikwissenschaftler:innen wie Dave Karpf kritisieren diese Technologieversessenheit der Journalist:innen mit Fokus auf psychologischem Targeting schon seit Längerem.

Von Adrienne Fichter im Text Zu skandalös oder zu unkritisch (2023)

Generating social media interactions is easy; mobilizing activists and persuading voters is hard. Online disinformation and propaganda do not have to be particularly effective at duping voters or directly altering electoral outcomes in order to be fundamentally toxic to a well-functioning democracy, though.

Von David Karpf im Text On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths (2019)

Es ist nach aktuellem Forschungsstand nicht erwiesen, dass psychometrische Modelle und Big-Data-Operationen hinter Facebook-Anzeigen unentschlossene Wählerinnen zu einem Kandidaten treiben. Deshalb sprechen Politologen wie Dave Karpf bei diesem Thema von einem hartnäckigen Mythos, der von Medien und vor allem in der Kommunikationswissenschaft fortgeschrieben werde.

Von Adrienne Fichter im Text Die Digitalisierung ist politisch (2020)

We pay a price for the telling and retelling of this story. The problem is that the myth of the digital propaganda wizard is fundamentally at odds with the myth of the attentive public. If the public is so easily duped, then our political elites need not be concerned with satisfying their public obligations. If real power lies with the propagandists, then the traditional institutional checks on corruption can be ignored without consequence.

Von David Karpf im Text On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths (2019)

The first-order effects of digital disinformation and propaganda, at least in the context of elections, are debatable at best. But disinformation does not have to sway many votes to be toxic to democracy. The second-order effects undermine the democratic myths and governing norms that stand as a bulwark against elite corruption and abuse of power. In amplifying the myth of the digital propaganda wizard, we run the risk of undermining the load-bearing norms that desperately need to be reinforced.

Von David Karpf im Text On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths (2019)

But what is less clear is just how different Cambridge Analytica’s product actually was from the type of microtargeted digital advertisements that every other US electoral campaign uses. Many of the most prominent researchers warning the public about how Cambridge Analytica uses our digital exhaust to “hack our brains” are marketing professors, more accustomed to studying the impact of advertising in commerce than in elections. The political science research community has been far more skeptical. An investigation from Nature magazine documented that the evidence of Cambridge Analytica’s independent impact on voter behavior is basically nonexistent (Gibney 2018). There is no evidence that psychographic targeting actually works at the scale of the American electorate, and there is also no evidence that Cambridge Analytica in fact deployed psychographic models while working for the Trump campaign. The company clearly broke Facebook’s terms of service in acquiring its massive Facebook dataset. But it is not clear that the massive dataset made much of a difference.

Von David Karpf im Text On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths (2019)